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Abstract: In his recent paper, “What 
a Real Argument is,” Ben Hamby 
attempts to provide an adequate 
theoretical account of “real” 
arguments. In this paper I present 
and evaluate both Hamby’s 
motivation for distinguishing “real” 
from non-“real” arguments and his 
articulation of the distinction. I 
argue that neither is adequate to 
ground a theoretically significant 
class of “real” arguments, for the 
articulation fails to pick out a stable 
proper subclass of all arguments that 
is simultaneously both theoretically 
relevant and a proper subclass of all 
arguments. 
 
 
Résumé: Dans son récent article, 
«What a Real Argument is», Ben 
Hamby tente de fournir une expli-
cation théorique adéquate des 
arguments «réels». Dans cet article, 
je présente et évalue la motivation 
de Hamby pour distinguer les 
arguments «réels» des arguments 
"non-réels" et pour communiquer 
cette distinction. Je soutiens 
qu’aucune de ces motivations est 
suffisante pour justifier une classe 
théoriquement importante 
d'arguments «réels», car il ne réussit 
pas à identifier une sous-classe 
appropriée stable de tous les 
arguments qui est en même temps à 
la fois théoriquement pertinente et 
une sous-classe appropriée de tous 
les arguments. 
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1.   Introduction 
 
Are “real” arguments a theoretically significant subclass of 
arguments? In “What is a ‘Real’ Argument?” I extensively 
argued “no”. However, given the difficulties of conclusively 
proving a negative, I left open the challenge to advocates of 
“real” arguments to provide a viable articulation of the notion of 
“real” argument. In “What a Real Argument Is”, Ben Hamby 
takes up that challenge. He offers both a motivation for the 
notion of “real” argument and a proposed articulation.  
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 In what follows, I present and evaluate both the 
motivation and the articulation. I shall argue that neither is 
adequate to ground a theoretically significant class of “real” 
arguments. I begin with the motivation. 
 
 
2.  The Motivation  
 
Why bother trying to distinguish, within the class of genuine 
arguments, so called “real” arguments from non-“real” 
arguments? Traditional answers have included demarcating the 
subject matter or scope of informal logic or showing the 
shortcomings of formal logic. According to Hamby, however, 
“real” arguments “serve the important theoretical use of 
demarcating the arguments that should be studied in a basic 
reasoning course”(Hamby 2012, p. 313). But why think that 
demarcating the arguments that should be studied in a basic 
reasoning course is a theoretical use of the distinction? A 
correct theory of arguments could articulate the ontology and 
types of arguments even if, for perhaps bizarre sociological 
reasons, there were no basic reasoning courses. But then, if the 
theory had a reason for distinguishing “real” and “unreal” 
arguments, it would not be to identify “the arguments that 
should be studied in a basic reasoning course.” 
 Granted, if there is a legitimate distinction between 
“unreal” and “real” arguments, and “real” arguments meet the 
pedagogical demands of basic reasoning courses, then there 
would be pedagogical reasons to focus on “real” arguments in 
such courses. Of course, if “real” arguments did not meet the 
pedagogical demands of basic reasoning courses, then there 
would be pedagogical reasons not to focus on such arguments. 
Either way the legitimacy of the distinction is prior to the 
determination of the focus of basic reasoning courses. In 
addition, the determination of focus is ultimately determined by 
the pedagogical demands and not the theoretical legitimacy of 
the distinction. 
But suppose the distinction is theoretically illegitimate. 
Would that be enough to delegitimize any pedagogical use of 
the distinction regardless of pedagogical demands? If it would, 
then granting a legitimate pedagogical role to “real” arguments 
means there is some theoretically legitimate underpinning. 
Indeed, towards the end of his paper, Hamby writes: “if there is 
a legitimate pedagogical use for the distinction, then we should 
hope that that distinction pulls some theoretical weight”(Hamby 
2012, p. 323). 
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I flat out deny the conditional. Legitimate pedagogical 
uses need not be grounded in accurate theory. For example, 
there is a very pedagogically useful class of frictionless inclined 
planes in physics classes, but such planes have no theoretical 
place at all. No adequate physical theory suggests there are such 
entities. In fact our best physical theories suggest that such 
entities are impossible. Regardless, getting students to begin 
initial calculations of accelerations or forces while ignoring 
friction is pedagogically useful. Pedagogically we may 
distinguish between high premise arguments and low premise 
arguments (and pedagogically prefer the latter), but there is no 
theoretical relevance to typing arguments by the number of 
premises. 
Suppose there is a roughly delineated class of arguments 
that could be pointed to, for pedagogical reasons, as the proper 
basis of critical thinking or basic reasoning courses. Should (or 
must) our theory of arguments include a demarcation of such 
arguments? Not necessarily. 
Firstly, Hamby acknowledges that not all “real” 
arguments are good candidates for a basic reasoning course. 
“Such arguments could be considered pedagogically unattractive 
because they require too much knowledge even to get off the 
ground”(Hamby 2012, p. 318). I also suspect that there are 
pedagogical reasons for using allegedly, prospectively unusable 
arguments to make an educational point—for example, one 
might use a bizarre example such as, “If Socrates is a chicken, 
then Socrates has feathers; Socrates has feathers, so Socrates is a 
chicken”, to get students to focus on the form rather than the 
content. Because the content is bizarre or absurd, students 
discount it as the relevant feature and focus instead on the 
pattern of reasoning—exactly what might be desired in an initial 
presentation of the fallacy of affirming the consequent. 
So the class of arguments that should be the focus of a 
basic reasoning course is certainly smaller than the class of 
“real” arguments, and some of the arguments presented in such a 
course may, for pedagogical reasons, be outside the bounds of 
“real” arguments altogether. Hence, pointing to arguments that 
should be the focus of a basic reasoning class as the motivation 
for a theoretical subclass of “real” arguments is inconclusive at 
best. 
Secondly, there are pedagogical reasons for selecting 
certain arguments as the target of analysis in a basic reasoning 
class rather than others. Complexity and background knowledge 
required for understanding are certainly relevant criteria. I 
strongly suspect that “likelihood of use in contexts of relevance 
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to our students” could be added as a selection criterion. I suspect 
that we can, for the most part, easily distinguish those arguments 
more likely to see use from those less likely to see use. But none 
of these pedagogical criteria are themselves theoretically 
relevant. Our theory of arguments need not distinguish complex 
arguments from non-complex arguments
1
, or distinguish 
arguments requiring significant background knowledge from 
those that do not. Arguments about the secession of Quebec may 
be relevant for Canadian students and so get chosen for 
inclusion in a Canadian critical thinking class, but not at all 
relevant for American students and so not get selected for an 
American critical thinking class. But again, we are not thereby 
led to believe that there is a theoretically significant distinction 
between arguments about the secession of Quebec and those not, 
or between arguments relevant to Canadian students and those 
relevant to American students. More generally, since the 
pedagogical criteria themselves do not appear to be theoretically 
relevant distinctions, we should not think that a class of 
arguments that satisfies the pedagogical constraints is a 
theoretically relevant class of arguments. 
 To sum up, I am not moved by the pedagogical 
motivation that Hamby offers. While we want what we teach to 
be ultimately grounded in the truth, we quite legitimately 
idealize and simplify that truth in order to get our students 
firmly directed towards it. Hence, pointing at a potentially 
legitimate pedagogical distinction does not necessarily indicate 
that a theoretically legitimate distinction lurks underneath. 
Additionally, we can delineate a rough and ready class of 
arguments for basic reasoning or critical thinking classes on the 
basis of criteria such as “not requiring too much background 
knowledge”, “having a certain level of complexity”, “having 
prospective use”, or “being relevant to our students”, etc., 
without our theory of arguments demarcating a subclass of 
arguments that are the “real” ones. 
 Even though we should not be moved by Hamby’s 
motivation for making the distinction, Hamby may still have 
provided a distinction that can serve as a theoretically legitimate 
                                                        
1 There is a (contentious) theoretical use of ‘simple’ and ‘complex’ with 
regards to arguments that should not be confused with pedagogical 
judgments concerning argumentative complexity. A ‘simple’ argument is 
one with a single conclusion, but some of those arguments can be too 
convoluted and complex for a basic reasoning course. A ‘complex’ 
argument is one composed of multiple simple arguments interconnected 
in various ways, but many of these are straightforward enough for 
inclusion in a basic reasoning course.  
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distinction between “real” and “unreal” arguments. I turn to his 
proffered distinction in the next section. 
 
 
3.  The Articulation 
 
According to Hamby “a real argument … is a practical 
argument, in the sense that it serves or could serve as a tool of 
persuasion or for some other use in the context of the 
communicative practice of establishing good candidates for 
belief and action”(Hamby 2012, p. 321). He also describes 
“real” arguments as “prospectively useful” arguments where “an 
argument has prospective usefulness when it could be offered in 
practice to support a controversial candidate claim that calls for 
judgment in the context of deciding what to believe or do”(p. 
313). Hamby claims these sorts of arguments “matter to people 
substantively”(p. 313), “are relevant arguments with conclusions 
that matter to people in substantive ways” (p. 314), and are 
“non-trivial arguments that matter in real-life”(p. 314). These 
arguments are to be contrasted with the arguments “that are not 
used, nor could prospectively be used, to some end of 
argumentation in the practice of forming beliefs and deciding 
what to do”(p. 324). 
“Real” arguments then are substantial, relevant, non-
trivial, matter in real life, and involve controversial claims. 
Since these descriptors are not synonyms there is already a 
problem of demarcation. Is satisfying all the descriptors a 
requirement for an argument to be “real” or must an argument 
merely satisfy at least one? Even if we suppose that an argument 
that satisfies none of the descriptors is definitely not a “real” 
argument, and one that satisfies all of them definitely is “real”, 
we still will not know what to do with mixed cases. In an 
uncontested theocracy, the conclusion ‘God exists’ will be 
uncontroversial, yet still substantial. Whether Mozambique will 
ever invade Zimbabwe may be substantial, yet irrelevant to our 
concerns. Whether objects can be dispensed with in favor of 
properties in a logical model may be controversial, but will not 
matter in real life. Are the arguments in these cases “real” or 
not? Given that we want our theoretical categories to be 
exhaustive, for any argument we should, in principle, be able to 
tell whether it is “real” or not—so far this is not true of Hamby’s 
articulations. 
          Suppose, however, that the status of the mixed cases is 
clarified. Regardless, whether a conclusion or argument is 
substantial, controversial, relevant, or matters in real life 
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depends upon our interests and goals. Whether concrete physical 
objects are metaphysically real is controversial and matters to 
(some) philosophers, but is irrelevant to most everyone else. 
Whether two angels can occupy the same space was a 
substantial issue for Aquinas, but was inane from the 
perspective of critics of scholasticism. Arguing for the 
conclusion that “the whole is greater than its parts” would have 
been considered an exercise in triviality for centuries, but post 
Cantor and Dedekind arguing for it would be controversial. 
What is substantial, relevant, or controversial to one person may 
not be so to another. But if, say, “being substantial” is a criterion 
of “real” arguments, then an argument can be “real” for one 
person and not “real” for another. Our theory of arguments 
should eschew such relativistic categories. We do not want our 
theoretical ontology to be determined by our interests and goals; 
we are supposed to discover and articulate the way the world is, 
not the way we want it to be. 
 One option for the advocates of “real” arguments is to 
claim that there is an objective category of “substantial” 
arguments or “relevant” arguments. Aquinas was either giving a 
substantial argument concerning angels occupying the same 
space or he was not, and if he was not then he was not giving a 
“real” argument. (I admit that what the objective basis for an 
argument “being substantial” might be is beyond me.) Another 
option is to claim that arguments are “real” if they are 
substantial or relevant or controversial for even one individual. 
Unfortunately for the advocates of “real” arguments, both 
options run into difficulties once we add in the “actually used” 
or “prospectively used” aspects of Hamby’s proposed 
distinction. I begin with “actually used”. 
Does an argument that is actually used in the practice of 
forming beliefs and deciding what to do (or persuading others in 
this regard) automatically count as a real argument? On the one 
hand Hamby should say “yes” since non-“real” arguments are, 
according to him, those that are not used nor could prospectively 
be used to some end of argumentation. Since they actually are 
used, the arguments count as “real”. But on the other hand “real” 
arguments are supposed to support controversial candidate 
claims, or be non-trivial arguments that matter in real life, or 
have conclusions that matter to people in substantive ways. In 
the latter case, genuine arguments that have actually been used 
to argue for uncontroversial claims or that do not matter to 
people (despite what the proponents of the argument might 
think) are not “real”. Hence, if we respect both the “unreal could 
not be used” and the “real are substantial, controversial, etc.” 
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aspects of Hamby’s demarcation, then actually used trivial 
arguments will count as both “real” and not “real”, which is a 
theoretical non-starter. But if we can only respect at most one 
aspect, which should it be? 
Suppose that there is an objective fact of the matter, 
independent of our attitudes, whether a given argument is 
substantive (or controversial or relevant) or not. Suppose further 
that at least some of the criticisms charging actual arguments 
used in argumentative contexts with being trivial are correct. If 
actual use in an argumentative context is sufficient for an 
argument to count as “real”, then Hamby needs to drop the 
descriptors “relevant”, “substantial”, “controversial”, etc., since 
arguments that fail to meet these criteria have actually been used 
in practice (and have been criticized for failing to meet these 
criteria). For example, at least part of Donald Davidson’s 
argument (Davidson, 1973) against conceptual schemes is that, 
understood in a particular way, the claim the conceptual 
relativists are arguing for is trivial or uncontroversial. But if 
Davidson is right that the claim being argued for is trivial or 
uncontroversial, then we have actual arguments (and so “real” 
arguments) concerning what is trivial or uncontroversial. More 
generally, to deny that any actual arguments have been made for 
what is trivial or uncontroversial—to claim that “preaching to 
the choir” has never occurred in argumentative contexts—seems 
problematic at best.  
On the other hand, if actual “real” arguments must not 
only be actually used, but also be substantive or relevant or 
concern what is controversial, then, assuming Davidson is right, 
the conceptual relativists were not giving “real” arguments; nor, 
if the critics of Aquinas are right, was Aquinas giving a “real” 
argument for the possibility of two angels occupying the same 
space. But charging arguers with arguing for something already 
accepted or uninteresting has a long history. If, however, these 
arguments are not “real”, and the focus of basic reasoning 
courses is supposed to be “real” arguments, then teaching these 
arguments (and the general “show arguing for something 
uninteresting” strategy) is also not proper in a basic reasoning 
class. That seems wrong. If these arguments are reasonable 
targets of instruction and criticism despite not being “real”, then 
once again Hamby’s motivation for making the distinction is not 
lining up with the proffered distinction, and I have no idea why 
we are trying to distinguish “real” arguments from non-“real” 
ones. 
Suppose instead that an argument being substantive or 
controversial or relevant for at least one individual is sufficient 
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to make the argument “real”. Presuming that the conceptual 
relativist or Aquinas took their arguments seriously, their 
arguments would count as “real”. More generally, we must 
separate out our collective judgments of arguments being 
substantive from what proponents (or receivers) of the 
arguments might believe. An arguer (or a receiver) believing 
that an argument has substance or argues for a controversial 
claim is, on the current supposition, enough to make an 
argument “real”. But one might wonder whether any argument 
will be excluded on such a liberal understanding of substantial 
or controversial, etc. Assuming that all actually used arguments 
have at least one individual who takes them seriously, then all 
actually used arguments will count as “real”, regardless of how 
insubstantial or trivial they might seem to us. But given that we 
are not merely interested in arguments that actually have been 
made, but the ones that could be made, I suspect the exclusion 
problem will only get worse. I turn next to arguments that 
“could be made in the context of judging what to do or believe”.  
 Recall that according to Hamby, “real” arguments are 
ones that “could be offered in practice to support a controversial 
candidate claim that calls for judgment in the context of 
deciding what to believe or do”(Hamby 2012, p. 313), or “could 
serve as a tool of persuasion or for some other use in the context 
of the communicative practice of establishing good candidates 
for belief and action”(p. 321); whereas non-“real” arguments are 
“instances of genuine arguments that are not used, nor could 
prospectively be used, to some end of argumentation in the 
practice of forming beliefs and deciding what to do”(p. 324). 
Hamby argues that there are genuine arguments on both sides of 
the “could be used/could not be used” divide. I shall argue that 
interpreting the divide so that there are arguments on both sides 
will make the divide theoretically irrelevant. Attempting to 
avoid the charge of irrelevance will require making the “could 
not be used” side of the divide empty. But if one side of the 
divide is empty, then the divide is still theoretically irrelevant. 
Hence, either way, the divide is theoretically irrelevant.  
Consider an argument concerning whether the sun will 
generate an Earth threatening solar flare in the next 50 years. 
Clearly such a conclusion matters to us and is significant to what 
we do and believe. But also suppose that this argument, given 
the complexity of the interior of the sun, has a million premises. 
Though there is a perfectly coherent sense in which it is not 
practical for us, limited as we are, to use this argument, it is 
certainly an argument that concerns something that matters, is 
substantive, and so satisfies most of the descriptors Hamby uses 
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to clarify what a “real” argument is. So is this hypothetical 
argument a “real” argument or not? 
 If it is not, because of the lack of “prospective use”, then 
once again Hamby’s descriptors do not capture “real” 
arguments. But more importantly, if it is not a “real” argument, 
then the range of “real” arguments seems quite parochial, 
limited by our current abilities and knowledge. Since Cicero 
could not use any argument in quantum physics, does it follow 
that they were not “real” then, but are “real” now? The 
arguments that eight-year-olds can use are different than those 
that many grown adults can practically use—so are the 
arguments we can use, but they cannot, “real” for us and not 
“real” for them and vice versa? Again, this sort of relativism is 
to be avoided in our theoretical ontology.  
 If the hypothetical solar flare argument is a “real” 
argument (or the eight-year-old’s simplistic arguments are 
“real”), then we must understand “could be used” quite liberally. 
If even one potential arguer could use the argument in the 
context of deciding what to do or believe, then the argument will 
count as “real”. (If we hold that an argument could be used if at 
least one arguer [or receiver] holds the argument to be 
significant or relevant or controversial, then this option lines up 
with the option we considered previously.) But if just one 
potential user is sufficient to make an argument “real”, then it is 
hard to see what arguments might be excluded by Hamby’s 
account. Arguments that seem inane to us may seem perfectly 
substantial and reasonable to use for those less intellectually 
perspicuous than we are, just as many of our substantial 
arguments may seem inane to Laplacian super-geniuses. Also if 
an omnipotent being counts as a potential arguer and an 
omnipotent being can do anything logically possible, then such a 
being could use any argument just so long as it was not logically 
impossible to use such an argument. But are there any genuine 
arguments that are logically impossible to use? Using them in 
the context of deciding what to do or believe would entail a 
contradiction? 
In general the problem is as follows: in its most general 
sense “could be used in the context of judging what to do or 
believe” does not exclude any arguments (or if it does, I do not 
yet know what these arguments are) in which case “real” is just 
another word for genuine argument and Hamby has already 
conceded that “real” arguments are supposed to be a proper 
subclass of genuine arguments (Hamby 2012, p. 324). 
Understanding “could be used” as “could be used by us (or those 
intellectually like us) in normal circumstances” introduces a 
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parochialism and relativism into our categories that have no 
place in our theoretical ontology. Take all the arguments that 
ever were, are, or will be and all the genuine arguments that ever 
could have been or could be. Is there a genuine stable proper 
subset of those arguments that are the “real” ones? That is the 
generality we seek in our theoretical ontology.  
I doubt that there is a stable middle ground. At the same 
time, I admit that the examples in the previous paragraphs, while 
suggestive, do not conclusively prove that there is no stable 
middle ground for “could be used”. Regardless, if there were a 
substantial theoretical payoff (or even any theoretical payoff) to 
the notion of a “real” argument, doubts about a theoretically 
stable use of “could be used” would not be enough to warrant 
giving up the chase. But the advocates of “real” arguments have 
yet to provide a reason to demarcate “real” arguments that 
comes close to corresponding to what they think “real” 
arguments might be. 
Suppose for the moment, however, that we take up the 
challenge of trying to find a sense of ‘could be used’ that charts 
a stable middle ground between allowing in all genuine 
arguments and being so parochial or relative in scope that it has 
no theoretical merit. Whatever this alleged middle ground is, 
Hamby has yet to find it. Consider his example: 
 
Socrates was a man; All men are mortal; therefore, 
Socrates is mortal. 
 
According to Hamby, “this argument is not real, because it is 
unlikely that anyone would ever use it to support its 
uncontroversial conclusion”(Hamby 2012, p. 321). But “real” 
arguments are arguments that could be used as tools of 
persuasion (amongst other possible uses in argumentative 
contexts). Even if it is unlikely that the Socrates argument be so 
used, it still presumably could be so used and so fits Hamby’s 
articulation of “real” argument. Consider Plato’s arguments 
about the immortality of the soul and that Socrates is better 
identified with that soul than his body. Now imagine a 
contemporary of Plato trying to rebut Plato’s arguments by 
appeal to common sense. He argues by reminding his audience 
that all men are mortal and that Socrates was a man, in which 
case they must conclude that Socrates is mortal. The audience 
agrees and the contemporary goes on to use the conclusion that 
Socrates is mortal to argue that Plato’s view about Socrates’ 
immortality, or that Socrates is better identified with his soul 
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rather than his body (or the combination of the two) must be 
wrong.
2
 
Plato of course will not be persuaded by this argument, 
for he will disagree with the “all men are mortal” premise. But 
even someone who has heard Plato’s arguments may judge “all 
men are mortal” to be more likely true than false and so accept 
the “Socrates is mortal” conclusion, contra Plato, on the basis of 
the other two premises. Alternatively, someone might 
independently believe all men are mortal, but require convincing 
that Socrates is a man rather than the son of Zeus and a naiad. 
Upon being convinced of the man-ness of Socrates one could be 
persuaded, on the basis of the two premises, that Socrates was 
mortal. If even one of these potential scenarios is one in which 
the Socrates argument is used in the context of deciding what to 
do or believe, then the argument is, contra Hamby, a “real” 
argument. 
 What about this even more implausible argument: 
 
Lemons are red, so the moon is made of blue cheese. 
 
Imagine you and I are trapped, or at least our online avatars are 
trapped, in one of many possible online artificial worlds. Which 
world we are trapped in matters, since the location of the 
emergency escape override varies from world to world. I am 
trying to convince you that we are in the “moon is made of blue 
cheese” world. Since we both know that all the “lemons are red” 
worlds are also “moon made of blue cheese” worlds, I can point 
to the red lemon in my avatar’s hand and type “lemons are red, 
so the moon is made of blue cheese” as a way to convince you 
we are indeed in a blue cheese moon world, so we should head 
to location z.
3
 But if the Lemons argument could reasonably be 
used and so counts as “real”, then what arguments will not count 
as “real”? 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
2 Or imagine trying to console a kindergartner, whose grandfather has 
just died, with, “All people die eventually, dear.” Sad kindergartner: “But 
Grandma is a person too.” “Yes, honey.” New round of tears as 
kindergartner comes to the conclusion that grandma will eventually die. 
3 Note a consequence of this example: trying to find an absolute, 
objective sense of “relevant” is misguided—anything can be made 
relevant to anything else. A more interesting question is: given a certain 
context of fixed facts, is a relevant to b? See also David Botting, 2013. 
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4.  Mere Examples 
 
I am skeptical that there are any arguments that fail to be such 
that they “could be used, or even reasonably used, in the context 
of deciding what to do or to believe.” 4 What follows is a very 
general argument for that claim—arguing against it is self-
defeating. 
 I take the existence or non-existence of “real” arguments 
to be a substantial point of contention between us. It matters for 
what we ought to believe, given we are interested in the truth. 
Suppose Hamby insists that the examples I gave above are not 
“real” arguments. Or suppose that Hamby grants my claims 
about the above examples, but offers yet other examples. To 
convince me that his examples are not “real” arguments, Hamby 
has to argue that the proposed examples fail to be “real” 
arguments. I presume such an argument will go like this: X 
lacks the properties required for an argument to be a “real” 
argument; hence, X is not a “real” argument. But how can 
Hamby, or anyone, make that argument without using X within 
the context of deciding what to do or believe? 
 Claiming that X is merely part of the main argument will 
not do. X is an argument and it is “used in argumentative 
practice to form beliefs and make decisions” and so satisfies 
Hamby’s account. But, defenders of “real” arguments might 
                                                        
4 At one point in his paper, Hamby takes me to task for quickly 
dismissing a restriction on use like “reasonable” use (Hamby 2012, p. 
323). I dismissed it only insofar as no articulation of what could be 
meant by “reasonably used” had been offered, so no theoretically 
relevant or significant definition of “real” argument in terms of 
“reasonable use” has been provided. Hamby still has not provided an 
articulation of “reasonable use” in his current paper. Surely it is up to the 
defenders of “real” argument to provide such an articulation.  
I admit that I was, and remain, skeptical that a theoretically 
adequate articulation could be provided. Some of my reasons have been 
articulated here: reasonableness, like consequentialness or relevance, is 
dependent on our goals and interests such that an argument might be 
reasonably used by one person, but not another. Also, the use of some 
arguments in a particular context might be criticized precisely because 
the use of them in that context is unreasonable. But if people actually use 
such arguments and it is worth teaching students this sort of criticism, 
then they seem a prime candidate for basic reasoning courses; and the 
distinction, and the alleged motivation for the distinction do not mesh. 
Finally, I am deeply suspicious of trying to build reasonableness in at the 
level of our theoretical ontology. Reasonableness, in conjunction with 
our variable goals and interests, is supposed to be a consequence of our 
theory, not a primitive within it. 
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respond, X is merely being mentioned or X is being used as a 
mere example or X is not being used to argue for X’s 
conclusion. “Real” arguments, in contrast, can be used to argue 
for their conclusions. As Hamby claims at one point, “real” 
arguments are “not constructed merely for the sake of 
illustration, with no substantive content”(Hamby 2012, p. 322). 
So “real” arguments are not just arguments that could be used in 
the context of deciding what to do or believe; rather they are 
arguments that could be used to argue for their own conclusions 
and not merely used as examples or mentioned within the 
context of deciding what to do or believe. 
 Firstly, I doubt there is a clean distinction between using 
an argument to argue for its conclusion and using an argument 
as an example. Here is an example from Roy Sorensen (1996): 
 
Some arguments are composed solely of existential 
generalizations, so some arguments are composed solely 
of existential generalizations. 
 
The argument is used to argue for its conclusion on the very 
basis that it is an example of that sort of argument. Or consider: 
 
Petunias prance proudly past the pool, so some “unreal” 
arguments have absurd premises.  
 
Suppose this is not a “real” argument. But then it is an instance 
of an “unreal” argument with an absurd premise. Since the 
argument exemplifies the conclusion
5
, it should convince me of 
the truth of its conclusion, in which case we have an “unreal” 
argument that can be used to argue for the truth of its 
conclusion. Hence, according to our modified definition of 
“real” argument and contra our initial supposition, it is a “real” 
argument.  
 Secondly, adding the restriction that “unreal” arguments 
are ones that can never be used to argue, except as examples, 
does not sidestep the issues raised in the previous section. If the 
Lemons argument can be reasonably used, in at least some 
contexts, to argue for its conclusion, then I am hard pressed to 
see how to construct an argument that could not be used to argue 
for its conclusion in any context. What properties would such an 
argument have? Totally (seemingly) irrelevant premises would 
not be enough; nor would obviously false premises or an 
obviously true conclusion, since what is obvious to us may not 
                                                        
5 See Goddu 2012 for more discussion on exemplification and argument. 
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be obvious to others. In other counterfactual situations those 
premises could be true and in yet others that conclusion false. 
Unless we are going to rule dialethism (or the theological view 
that an omnipotent being can do anything, even bring about 
contradictions) out of court by fiat, we cannot even rule out the 
possibility that someone might argue using contradictory 
premises or argue for a contradictory conclusion. Once again we 
are in the position in which we either make parochial restrictions 
on what “can be used to argue for its conclusion” means, in 
which case the distinction will not be part of our correct theory 
of argument, or no genuine argument will be one that could only 
ever be used as an example or merely mentioned, in which case 
there is no distinction to be made. Either way there is no 
theoretically significant subclass of the class of genuine 
arguments that is the class of “real” arguments. 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
One should not think that I am denying that there are substantive 
arguments concerning controversial matters, or that I do not 
think that we are quite good at distinguishing substantive from 
trivial arguments, or useful arguments from non-useful 
arguments, or arguments that are more likely to see use from 
those that are not. I suspect we are quite good at making these 
discriminations and certainly good enough to make them such 
that if a certain subgroup of such arguments meets other 
pedagogical criteria, we could easily use such arguments as the 
basis of basic reasoning courses, at least as taught in the early 
21
st
 century. But all of this can be explained by appeal to a 
general, though certainly not universal, congruence of our 
abilities, interests, and background knowledge and not by an 
appeal to some underlying subclass of “real” arguments. 
What I do deny is that we have any good reason to think 
that our correct theory of arguments will have a distinction 
between “real” or “practical” and non-“real” or “impractical” 
arguments within it. Even if it turns out that there is a subclass 
of “real” arguments, I still have no idea what this class is and no 
reason to think such a subclass is theoretically relevant. 
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